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Neoclassical economics-the standard supply-and-demand analysis
taught in countless university economics courses-overwhelmingly
dominates the economics profession in teaching and scholarship.' It has
long been the virtually unchallenged choice of practitioners in the inter-
section of law and economics.2 As Michael Howard and John King
write, the success of neoclassical economics "has been phenomenal:
mainstream economics is technically rigorous, its procedures have been
widely emulated, and the subject commands great prestige."'
Things are now different, however, as the global economy struggles
to recover from what is widely referred to as the Great Recession. The
aura around neoclassical economics-like the bubbles generated (but
not anticipated) by those enamored with its logic-has burst. Today
there is increasing recognition that neoclassical economics does not
accurately predict, or even explain, human behavior.
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. The core of these remarks were
first offered at Class Crits III: Rethinking Economics and Law After the Great Recession, Baldy
Center for Law and Social Policy, University of Buffalo School of Law, May 17-18, 2010. The
author wishes to express appreciation to all the participants, and particularly to Randy Albelda and
Charles Whalen for taking them initially with puzzled plausibility.
** Professor of Economics, Utica College and Visiting Fellow, Cornell University School of
Industrial and Labor Relations. He also thanks participants in the Class Crits III workshop and is
appreciative of the opportunity to collaborate with Kenneth Casebeer across disciplines.
1. See generally Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking with Wolves: Left Legal Theory After the
Right's Rise, 54 BuFF. L. REV. 1191 (2007) (reviewing LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE (Wendy
Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002)).
2. For an article collecting sources of criticism of neoclassical law and economics, see
Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY
487 (1994). For an early analysis of the bias in the adoption of neoclassical economic method as
law and economics, see C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 3 (1975). For an alternative to market efficiency, see Martha T. McCluskey,
Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND.
L.J. 783 (2003).
3. M. C. Howard & J. E. King, Where Marx Was Right: Towards a More Secure Foundation
for Heterodox Economics, 25 CAMBRIDGE J. EcON. 785, 803 (2001).
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Of course, this is not news to heterodox economists.4 In fact, in the
view of many such economists-including institutionalists, feminists,
and post-Keynesians-neoclassical economics "is a farce. The concep-
tualization of economics agents is incoherent, modem market systems
are portrayed as a bazaar capable of being re-engineered according to
tastes rather than as relatively inflexible disciplinary structures, and the
coordination of rational human action always runs along the grooves of
voluntary agreements." 5
Heterodox economists have catalogued an extensive list of neoclas-
sical shortcomings.6 It is ahistorical and purely formal, requiring
assumptions that never obtain in the real world.' It depends on modeling
a choosing subject as a completely autonomous individual,' which is at
least unlikely as a description of human nature as that nature is actually
experienced.' And it depends on rationality-calculated by individual
maximizers of personal utility-independent of the distribution of
resources available to different individuals."o
Despite such shortcomings, neoclassical economics and its intellec-
tual forerunners have, for generations, been deployed to justify a process
of increasingly concentrated accumulation." Notice the progression of
4. 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF EcoNoucs 2-6 (2d ed. 2008).
5. Howard & King, supra note 3.
6. See MARc LAVOIE, INTRODUCTION TO POST-KEYNESIAN EcONOMICS 1-15 (2006).
7. See generally BRUNA INGRAO & GIORGIO ISRAEL, THE INVISIBLE HAo: ECONOMIC
EQUILIBRIUM IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE (Ian McGilvray trans., The Mass. Inst. Tech. Press
1990) (1987); Bruce E. Kaufman, The Original Industrial Relations Paradigm: Foundation for
Revitalizing the Field, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF WORK AND EMPLOYMENT:
REVITALIZING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AS AN ACADEMIc ENTERPRISE 31 (Charles J. Whalen ed.,
2008); HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (1986).
8. Howard & King, supra note 3, at 787.
Since the seventeenth century, liberal theorists have portrayed individuals as
essentially rational, and as approaching each other with their central characteristics
already given prior to any interaction. Social relationships thus appear as a means
and a constraint in satisfying purely private goals, and, although complex, involve
nothing more than the activities of individuals: there are no properties of social
relationships that cannot be derived from the characteristics of individuals.
See also William M. Dugger, Redefining Economics: From Market Allocation to Social
Provisioning, in POLMCAL ECONOMY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: CONTEMPORARY VIEWS ON THE
TREND OF ECONOMics 31 (Charles J. Whalen ed., 1996).
9. "[Amartya] Sen objects that the traditional approach reduces people to 'rational fools' and
that an economic theory based only on revealed preferences is unable to deal with what he calls
'commitment.'" Josh Whitford, Pragmatism and the Untenable Dualism of Means and Ends: Why
Rational Choice Theory Does Not Deserve Pragmatic Privilege, 31 THEORY & Soc'Y 325, 334
(2002). See also NANCY FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE HEART: ECONOMICS AND FAMILY VALUES (2001).
10. ROBERT H. HAVEMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 28-29, 43 (2d ed. 1976);
A. ALLAN SCHMID, CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: INSTITUTIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL EcONOMICS
14-15, 82-83 (2004).
11. Drawing on the work of Hyman Minsky, one can identify five stages of capitalism:
merchant capitalism (1607-1813), industrial capitalism (1813-1890), banker capitalism
142 [Vol. 66:141
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abstraction regarding what became central to economic practices
through the legalized definitions of capital and associated property rights
in succeeding stages of capitalism: 12
* In merchant capitalism, based on exchange of goods and services,
capital was largely tangible (e.g., land, buildings, resources, inven-
tory) and was provided and controlled by individuals or families.13
* During industrial capitalism, based on production of scale and spec-
ificity, capital also included stock ownership and bond issuance,
intangible but still traceable to specific assets, although managed
increasingly by enterprise employees.' 4
* Under banker or finance capitalism, based on access to secured
future performance, capital expanded to include debt instruments,
more intangible because securities might not have value upon being
due, managed in part by monitoring of enterprise success by banking
managers external to the capital-utilizing enterprise."
* In managerial capitalism, based increasingly on enterprise response
to uncertainties of geographical dispersion and both internal and
external risks expressed in monetized costs, capital included insur-
ance and other risk-pooling devices, as well as the ability to export
such risks beyond the firm, where-even when charged to the pro-
ducing enterprise-they were managed by financial intermediaries
largely independent of specific firms.16
* Finally, with money-manager capitalism, based on derivative finan-
cial instruments (resting on aggregated assumptions and depending
on forecast economic expansion-or, in fact, bubbles) capital
becomes financial flows: pure abstractions and legalized fictions in
which the same underlying social relations are repeatedly bought and
sold as derivatives." This form of capital adds little or nothing to
usable production." Indeed, the consequences of exchanging such
capital makes it impossible to enforce liabilities following a break-
down in economic performance, leaving third parties (often taxpay-
ers) holding the bag. Further, even their existence is mythical without
(1890-1933), managerial capitalism (1933-1982), and money-manager capitalism
(1982-present). See Hyman P. Minsky, Uncertainty and the Institutional Structure of Capitalist
Economies, 30 J. EcON. ISSUEs 357, 362 (1996); Charles J. Whalen, INTEGRATING SCHUMPETER
AND KEYNES: HYMAN MINSKY'S THEORY OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT, 35 J. EcON. ISSUEs 805,
810 (2001).
12. The key here is centrality to economic or market actions, not the precise date of their
invention. For example, loans were certainly used from times preceding capitalism.
13. See Whalen, supra note 11, at 810.
14. See id. at 810, 812.
15. See id. at 812.
16. See id. at 813.
17. See id. at 814.
18. Femando Toboso, On Institutional Individualism as a Middle-Way Mode of Explanation
for Approaching Organizational Issues, in ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES: EVOLUTION
AND IMPACT 203, 214 (Sandra S. Batie & Nicholas Mercuro eds., 2008).
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legal enablement, indeed legal invention. "Capital" itself becomes an
instrument of distribution.
The problem is that at the same time neoclassical economics is used
to justify an increasing concentration of accumulated "wealth," it fails as
social science. It is ultimately and purely tautological reduction in which
there is no human choice correctly understood, only human calcula-
tion.19 Most brutally, when employed as a methodology for making pol-
icy (especially with respect to financial markets and labor markets), it
has caused untold human misery and justified intolerable injustice for
masses of people.
Neoclassical economics cannot be used well in actual decision-
making because it is not contextual. 2 0 It separates the agent of choice
from the structures within which choice inevitably must be undertaken. 21
It thus inaccurately describes the actual possibilities of, and artificially
circumscribes the idea of, human freedom. Finally, neoclassical eco-
nomics has no account for power in analyzing social decisions. It is thus
bankrupt-despite long and widely held perceptions to the contrary-as
an acceptable guide for legal and policy decisions.2 2
Heterodox economics takes history, context, power, and structure
seriously, and, by combining those research premises, it more accurately
describes human behavior than neoclassical economics. Nevertheless,
challenges remain in the effort to supplant neoclassical theory with a
more useful approach to law and economics. One involves the need to
base such an economics on the reality of human interdependence.
19. Daniel W. Bromley, Institutional Economics as Volitional Pragmatism, in ALTERNATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES: EVOLUTION AND IMPACT, supra note 18, at 91, 94.
20. This applies as well to rational choice game theory. See Whitford, supra note 9, at
331-32.
[I]n "its theoretical method, rational choice theory assumes what is to be explained"
because it "inevitably require(s) the ad hoc introduction of extraneous variables"
and thus falls to the utilitarian dilemma: "either one adopts rational choice
assumptions, in which case the 'ends' of action remain 'random,' or one lets the
ends be determined in some way, in which environment overwhelms rational
choice."
(quoting Frank J. Lechner, The New Utilitarianism, in 10 CURRENT PERSPECTIVES IN SOCIAL
THEORY 93, 96 (John Wilson ed., 1990)). Some rational choice theorists have tried to expand
individual preferences by adding internalized other-regarding behavior as an additional rationality
calculus. See Lynn A. Stout, Social Norms and Other-Regarding Preferences, in NORMS AND THE
LAW 13, 14-17, 34 (John N. Drobak ed., 2006). Even other-regarding preferences, however, are
still "revealed preferences" and calculated as individually rational. Lynn Stout's analysis is
nonetheless helpful in citing studies showing that other-regarded choices are most often chosen
through communication and cooperation with other other-regarding persons.
21. See, e.g., Bromley, supra note 19.
22. See generally William M. Dugger, The State: Power and Dichotomy, in FUNDAMENTALS
OF THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 49, 49-57 (Warren J. Samuels ed., 1989).
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Another can be addressed by giving more attention to production as the
heterodox alternative to the neoclassical focus upon exchange.
There are no guarantees that taking interdependence and production
more seriously will be enough to displace neoclassical economics-or,
more importantly, that such a strengthened heterodox economics will
result in institutions that provide a context for choice experienced as
authentic to human nature and that promote human freedom as just. But
these changes will certainly move us in the right direction.
I. POWER, AGENCY, AND SOCIAL BEINGS
In the economic modeling of human behavior, agency must be
defined and related to the structure of social relations. Structure includes
not only material conditions, but also the institutionalized organization
of rules, conventions, and relations.2 3 Both aspects of structure are
dynamic and socially constructed. This suggests that agency-in the
case of either the individual or group-and structure are mutually
dependent. 24 This includes law as a form of social decision-making.
Law as rules and institutional practices-that is, structure-is
neither completely autonomous from economic conditions and non-law
social institutions nor reducible as epiphenomena of those conditions
and practices. 25 If law is consciousness-that is, agency-legal practices
are subject to a similar mutual constitution within social relations. Alas,
however, even institutional economists too often assume legal and politi-
cal institutions are relatively fixed for economic-choice purposes.2 6
Begin with ontology. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel begins, or at
least popularizes, the era of the Modem. He observes that human nature
is always and necessarily historically situated. 27 Nothing in our experi-
ence warrants the claim that there is any place outside experience from
which to stand and ahistorically critique the practices of the way things
are from moment to moment.2 8 Yet our experience is also that "the way
23. A. Allan Schmid, Power and the Troublesome Economist: Complementarities Among
Recent Institutional Theorists, in ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES: EVOLUTION AND
IMPACT, supra note 18, at 1, 23.
24. Id.
25. See E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 258-69
(1975).
26. See Neil Komesar, The Essence of Economics: Law, Participation and Institutional
Choice (Two Ways), in ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES: EVOLUTION AND IMPACT,
supra note 18, at 165, 167.
27. G. W. F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (A. V. Miller trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1977) (1807).
28. This reality is captured by the following popular expressions: "You can't step into the
same river twice" and "The time train has no stations to get off and then back on to resume going
somewhere." See LAVOIE, supra note 6, at 7, 14.
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things are" is not necessarily the way things ought to be.2 9 How can we
then account for agency in situations of change as anything more than
playing out the ideas already inscribed in present practices?3 0
Hegel argues that we as individuals live out our individual histories
in the expenditure of time and energy. But how do we gain meaning for
this activity? What we do never takes place in a vacuum.' What we do
parts from our control-in Hegel's terms, becomes "alienated"-but
also comes back to us in an inevitable social response.32 Our life's
meaning is thus dialectically constructed from this social interaction.3 3
Our human nature, therefore, is as social beings, not just individu-
als who are embedded in specific social contexts, but beings who, as
subjects, are interdependent. 3 4 Agency must be understood as interde-
pendent rather than as a matter of individual subjective rationality, no
matter how enlightened or progressive the individual professes it to be.
"[A] different methodology that more accurately captures the particular
interdependencies present in any specific situation is more appropriate
than anything which neoclassical economists have produced." 35
Turn to epistemology. Several conclusions follow. First, all mean-
29. See generally ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICs (1975).
30. See Kenneth Casebeer, Work on a Labor Theory of Meaning, 10 CARDOzo L. REV. 1637,
1654 (1989).
31. The oft-cited dualism between means and ends is not tenable. An end, or effect, soon
becomes a means, or cause, for what follows. Human activity is continuous, and "nothing happens
which is final in the sense that it is not part of an ongoing stream of events." John Dewey, Theory
of Valuation, in 2(4) INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNIFIED SCIENCE 43 (Otto Neurath et al.
eds., 1939).
32. HEGEL, supra note 27, at 111-12.
33. See Perry Anderson, Problems of Socialist Strategy, in TOWARDS SOCIALISM 221, 288-89
(Perry Anderson & Robin Blackburn eds., 1966) ("Man and society exist only as praxis, outside
themselves in the fluctuating interworld their actions compose together."); Whitford, supra note 9,
at 335 ("Theorists must recognize that the interests and choices of actors depend fundamentally on
their actual social relationships; the preference function chosen by the actor may well depend on
the situation and the real identities of the other players.").
34. This remains an unsettled matter even within heterodox economics, which proceeds from
an assumption of individuals as social beings, but still often treats them as individual agents
embedded in social contexts. See, e.g., RANDY ALBELDA ET AL., UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELDS:
UNDERSTANDING WAGE INEQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION 121, 126 (2001); Toboso, supra note
18, at 206-07. Cf SCHMID, supra note 10, at 2 (institutional economics "starts with the
observation that people are interdependent"). A key intellectual inspiration for A. Allan Schmid is,
of course, John R. Commons, who saw the transaction as "the ultimate unit of activity, which
correlates law, economics, and ethics"; according to Commons, this unit contains three vital
elements: "conflict, dependence, and order." JOHN R. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: ITS
PLACE IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 58 (1934).
35. Howard & King, supra note 3, at 790. See also COMMONs, supra note 34, at 85 (the
individual rationality of neoclassical economics applies only in cases such as "the isolated farmer
to the extent that he produces for his own use.").
[Vol. 66:141146
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ing is socially constructed, constituted by contexts of experience.16
There is no place else to construct content. All claims of knowledge are
learned through received experience-discourse practices-and even if
the experience is sensually direct, then it has meaning to us in our prac-
tices through learned symbols."
Second, knowledge is therefore provisional. Knowledge claims can
only be "verified" by their social workability." This is not a matter of
instrumental utility," but rather of pragmatism.4 0 Knowledge is pro-
duced under conditions no different in principle from the production of
goods, services, technologies, or institutions. As buildings either stand
or fall down over time,4' so do claims of knowledge, paradigms, dis-
courses, and therefore, social relations.4 2 All of these either continue to
work in a rough manner or they do not.4 3 There can be no claim of a
necessary connection between how we know and any "true" underlying
reality as demanded by realist or empirical epistemologies.'
36. See generally PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966).
37. See Albrecht Wellmer, What is a Pragmatic Theory of Meaning? Variations on the
Proposition "We Understand a Speech Act When We Know What Makes It Acceptable.", in
PHILOSOPHICAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE UNFINISHED PROJECT OF ENLIGHTENMENT 171, 174 (Axel
Honneth et al. eds., William Rehg trans., 1992) ("[W]e mistake the concepts of sentence meaning,
intended meaning, and understanding from the start if we do not make the intersubjectivity of a
common language the point of departure for the analysis.").
38. See Casebeer, supra note 30.
39. See Lawrence A. Boland, A Critique of Friedman's Critics, 17 J. EcON. LITERATURE 503,
506 (1979).
40. See Whitford, supra note 9, at 342 ("Pragmatism rejects the maximizing assumption as
dependent on a knowledge of ends that have yet to be discovered, and posits in its place an actor
who hypothesizes solutions to the problem, adjusting with experience."). See also WENDELL
GORDON, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: THE CHANGING SYSTEM 43-44 (1980); William T. Waller,
Jr., Avoiding the Cartesian Vice in Radical Institutionalism: A Reply to Mayhew, 24 J. ECON.
ISSUES 897, 899 (1990).
41. See Whitford, supra note 9, at 338 ("Hence, we can assess the adequacy of the particular
means chosen, asking if it can in fact be expected to cause the ends-in-view, just as one can
question whether or not the architect's drawings are adequate to their role in the successful
building of the house (to use [John] Dewey's earlier metaphor).").
42. See Bromley, supra note 19, at 105 ("Individuals . . . work out what seems best by
working out what seems possible as they work their way toward what they will come to realize
seems best."). Volitional pragmatism, however, is an inadequate form of pragmatism because it
sees all meaning as ideational expressions and therefore all choices as embedded in discourse. It is
seemingly post-modem rather than modem. Workability depends on meaning certainly, but that
meaning depends on conditions underlying differences in experience, and thus is freighted by
power within social relationships.
43. See generally LUDWIG WrrrGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND THE BROWN BOOKs (Harper &
Row 1958).
44. [D]esires arise in and depend on context. They are inseparable from the conditions
that render possible the resolution of the problem, rather than chosen from a
portfolio of pre-ordered end-states (even one as reflexive as the tinkerers propose).
Through action, subjects learn the results of desires that "are subject to frustration"
just as "interests are subject to defeat."
148 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:141
Yet third, our claims of knowledge, our communicative discourses,
all our social interactions, are produced under conditions of inequality
and are to that extent distorted by power to subordinate other actors
within contextual privilege,4 5 whether such privilege is produced by
exploitation (class), domination (gender), exclusion (race), or any other
categorization.46 The privileged will always seek to preserve their
power, which they will falsely see as pragmatic, individual self-inter-
est.4 7 The subordinated, meanwhile, will always experience such dis-
torted interaction as aliened-not of their own.4 8 Under prevailing
conditions associated with relations of inequality of power, all individu-
als inevitably will still behave strategically on the claim of perceived
self-interest, but the alienated will choose as best they can or are
allowed. Just as inevitably, however, alienated and subordinated per-
sons struggle within unequal contexts by protesting and demanding
change.49
To work against these conditions of inequality, rationality must be
more than procedural."o Making social interactions more transparent or
information more widely available will not overcome subordination
because the substantive, institutionalized choices will still be distorted in
Whitford, supra note 9, at 345. See contra LAVOIE, supra note 6, at 8. At first blush, this statement
about realist epistemology might seem at odds with the view of Marc Lavoie, whose heterodox
economics rests on a realist epistemology. Id. at 7-8. But one must keep in mind Lavoie is
responding to the neoclassical argument that a useful economic theory need not make any attempt
to explain how the economy works. Thus, to return to Dewey's architectural metaphor, heterodox
economists such as Lavoie suggest merely that we are more likely to succeed at building a
residence when we begin with drawings of a house, not a helicopter.
45. Schmid, supra note 23, at 15.
46. See generally ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 34, at 122. See also William M. Dugger,
Radical Institutionalism: Basic Concepts, in RADICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 1, 8-9 (William M.
Dugger ed., 1989); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE ANATOMY OF POWER (1983).
47. "False consciousness" in Marxian terms.
48. Marx provided another reason why people would ultimately abandon oppressive
social relations: they are alienating. Marx used the concept of alienation to express
capitalism's separation of people from the results of their work (which are owned by
the capitalist) and from control over their work. Marx also wrote about how
capitalism reduced social relationships to money and things, and how this reduction
inhibited people from fully developing their human potentialities.
ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 34, at 140 (citation omitted). For a redeployment of Karl Marx
without distinguishing between economy and culture, see HERBERT MARCUSE, The Foundation of
Historical Materialism, in STUDIES IN CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 3 (Joris De Bres trans., 1972).
49. [A]ll descriptions as well as all evaluations are legitimately contestable on grounds
other than those of logic and empirical evidence. It follows that genuine neutrality is
impossible, irrespective of whether it pertains to theoretical pronouncements,
policies, laws or institutions, and the "interests" of specific agents become of central
relevance for understanding their substance.
Howard & King, supra note 3, at 789.
50. See contra LAVOIE, supra note 6, at 7, 9.
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content or recognized as alienated."1
While unequal power distributions will inevitably distort individu-
alistic calculations of "rational" preferences, the alternative is not, as
institutionalists have at times seemed to believe, socially holistic
"rationality" defined by social structure and operation independent of
individuals.5 2 Put in these dichotomous and exclusive terms, a different
understanding of "rationality" has been hidden. The masked rationality
cannot be a mere reform in the shape of either an "enlightened" individ-
ual or a "contingent" or fluid, holistic totality." The new rationality
must be a mutual rationality of interdependent individuals. Agency-to
be authentic to the ontology and epistemology of human beings within
history-must posit an interdependent subject, even though individuals
will articulate decisions.
At the micro level, a de-alienated context of social interaction will
depend on recognition-and action based on mutual recognition-of the
actors' interdependence. Action-including communication-recog-
nized as interdependent, will still be strategic as a matter of self-interest,
but now the motivation of self-defense, or choice, will be that of mutual
rationality, not individual rationality." Further, such mutual rationality
will depend on conditions of access to the contextual interaction that are
roughly equal. This equality cannot be abstract, but must be consistent
with solely historical experience, and as such will be known in the over-
coming of the alienation produced by inequality.
51. This is why systems of communicative rationality, such as most prominently that of
Jirgen Habermas, cannot be purged of distorted meaning. Still, such communication requires
overcoming certain inequalities, which is certainly a big start.
52. Toboso, supra note 18.
53. This is the otherwise insightful analysis of Fernando Toboso, supra note 13, at 208-13.
See also LAVOIE, supra note 6, at 9-10.
54. Pragmatic cooperation is apparently similar to the game-theoretic variety-"trust"
results from interaction between the parties-but it is not nearly so fragile and does
not depend on the fortuitous coincidence of mutually compatible interests, since
these do not exist in a well-defined state prior to interaction. ... [Game Theory does
not] "contemplate the specific possibility that the inner workings of cooperation
might transform the actors' understandings of one another in relation to the
commonly defined world in which their interests are rooted." [Charles] Sabel argues
that an adequate conceptualization of the Japanese model of production must
understand cooperation to be rooted in an institutional structure that encourages
sufficient interaction between the parties in such a way that they are able mutually
to reshape their interests to solve emergent problems ("learning by monitoring").
Whitford, supra note 9, at 350-51 (citation omitted).
55. Capital consumes social relations as individuals are forced into a daily struggle of
securing shares of value, leisure time is reduced, and social institutions are shaped
to serve capital, all of which limit access to food, medical care, education (and so
on) based on ability to pay. Capital transforms "ordinary consciousness" into
individualistic consumptive units that mistake capitalism's competitive social
relations for human nature, where people treat each other as "things".
1492011]
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At the macro level, de-alienated experience will depend on produc-
ing conditions of equal access to social decisions constituting power
(power is understood as authorization of activity). Such social action is
carried out through democratic institutions of decision-making prac-
tices.5 6 And such democracy cannot be only a form of democracy, but
must be experienced as authentic democracy by all participants." In this
way, the economic sovereignty of individuals and the citizen sovereignty
of individuals are inextricably linked although described separately. The
new economics is political economics.
Just as there is ontologically no place to stand external to historical
experience and from which to critique social practices, there also is epis-
temologically no privileged knowledge on which to stand internal to his-
torical experience and from which to critique social practices." There is
no justice! There is only the overcoming of injustice. Such is the Mod-
ern condition. Such is history.
II. ECONOMICS AND THE SOCIOLEGAL PROCESS
What, then, does history commit us to in economics? Neoclassical
economics, proceeding from an ahistorical and purely posited individu-
alistic calculus of rational behavior, is pure and simple fantasy-anti-
truth.6 0 In contrast, the institutionalists and other political-economists
making up heterodox economics begin with a commitment to history
Paul Paolucci, The Labor-Value Relation and its Transformations: Revisiting Marx's Value
Theory, in 27 CURRENT PERSPECTIVES IN SOCIAL THEORY, THEORIZING THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL
PROCESSES 163, 197 (Harry F. Dahms & Lawence Hazelrigg eds., 2010).
56. Within enterprises, the notion of worker sovereignty involves opportunities for significant
work and the development of one's capacities. Within the economy overall, the notion of citizen
sovereignty involves aggregating preferences in a way that gives individuals a meaningful voice.
See CHARLES K. WILBER & KENNETH P. JAMESON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE POVERTY OF ECONOMICS
7, 201 (1983). John R. Commons also attempted to address power and interdependence at both the
workplace and overall economy. See Bruce E. Kaufman, John R. Commons and the Wisconsin
School of Industrial Relations Strategy and Policy, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 25-27 (2003).
See generally Yngve Ramstad, From Desideratum to Historical Achievement: John R. Commons's
Reasonable Value and the "Negotiated Economy" of Denmark, 25 J. ECON. ISSUES 431 (1991).
57. For authenticity in this social sense, see CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY
47-53 (1992). See also ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 34, at 141; Dugger, supra note 46, at 125-28.
58. Institutionalists Glen W. Atkinson and Ted Oleson recognize both of these points and still
suggest a way forward for economic research. See generally Glen W. Atkinson & Ted Oleson,
Institutional Inquiry: The Search for Similarities and Differences, 30 J. EcoN. ISSUES 701 (1996).
59. See generally AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (2009). See also John R. Commons,
Marx To-day: Capitalism and Socialism, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1925, at 682.
60. "[D]emocratisation poses a threat to capitalist dynamics, which require that politics
remain contained in institutions that sustain liberal rights, and state bureaucracies not entertain any
social engineering which threatens these rights, no matter how much people might value this. . . .".
Howard & King, supra note 3, at 795. For recognition by two Nobel laureates of the
inapplicability of neoclassical economics to the real world, see Douglass C. North, Economic
Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 359, 360 (1994) and Paul Krugman, How Did
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and context,6' and with an idea of economic justice free of exploitation,
domination, and exclusion. 62 Their economics also has room for a solid
grounding in the reality of human interdependence.
A heterodox counter-narrative, providing an alternative to the neo-
classical explanation of economic behavior, is good for questioning pub-
lic policy offered by conventional economists and lawyers allied with
them, but it is not sufficient. What heterodox economics lacks is the
same sort of widely recognizable tools and methods of analysis that
characterize the neoclassical school. To be sure, many careers have been
devoted to development and application of such techniques; indeed, it
could be argued that heterodox economics suffers not from the absence
of a method, but rather from an overabundance of methods.6 1 "Let a
thousand flowers bloom" might make for a vibrant academic commu-
nity, yet it can also leave policymakers and other practitioners bewil-
dered when looking for sound advice.
It might not be possible for heterodox economics to unite around a
single toolkit that could be offered in place of the one used by neoclassi-
cal economists. Still, it is certainly an aim worthy of discussion and
exploration. And a logical starting point for the endeavor is the defini-
tion of economics that has become widely accepted among heterodox
scholars: economics is the science of social provisioning.6 4
Working from that definition, Hyman Minsky and Charles Whalen
Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/
magazine/06Economic-t.html?pagewanted=all.
61. LAVOIE, supra note 6, at 14.
62. In 1977, Wallace C. Peterson sought to identify common ground among the
institutionalists and political-economists inspired by John Maynard Keynes. The elements he
outlined continue to unite many heterodox economists: a) economic activity is an ongoing process
toward an uncertain future linked to culture and history; b) reason and rationality do not always
prevail in economic life-much behavior is chosen via accepted conventions; c) economic life is
full of conflict-competition does not imply social harmony; d) the state can be used for good or
ill, but excessive concentrations of power can only be redressed through the state; e)
considerations of equity and justice are integral to the study of income distribution; and f) money
is the key institution of contemporary capitalism. See generally Wallace C. Peterson,
Institutionalism, Keynes, and the Real World, II J. EcON. ISSUES 201 (1977). For a
complementary elaboration of the institutionalist approaches to power and justice, see Dugger,
supra note 8, at 49-57.
63. For example, in institutionalism alone, one finds a "social fabric matrix," the notion of a
"higher efficiency," and various approaches to "instrumental value theory." See F. Gregory
Hayden, Social Fabric Matrix: From Perspective to Analytical Tool, 16 J. EcON. ISSUES 637,
646-55 (1982); Steven R. Hickerson, Instrumental Valuation: The Normative Compass of
Institutional Economics, 21 J. EcON. ISSUES 1117, 1117-18 (1987); Philip A. Klein, Institutional
Reflections on the Role of the Public Sector, 18 J. ECON. ISSUES 45, 60-63 (1984).
64. See, e.g., William M. Dugger, Redefining Economics: From Market Allocation to Social
Provisioning, in POLITICAL ECONOMY FOR THE 21sT CENTURY: CONTEMPORARY VIEWS ON THE
TREND OF EcoNoMIcs, supra note 8, at 31, 35, 41-42; Marilyn Power, Social Provisioning as a
Starting Point for Feminist Economics, FEMINIST EcON., Nov. 2004, at 5-8.
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suggest that economic success requires "that every citizen have the
opportunity to develop and utilize his or her talents and capacities, and
that workers are rewarded with rising standards of living and the pros-
pect of an even better life for their children."6 5 In light of this, beginning
norms of social behavior might be posited lexically.
First, social actions must workably overcome existing conditions of
inequality of access to social relations producing historical experience.6 6
Freedom is an authentically unalienated experience and depends on an
agency of interdependence: the interdependent subject. Economic suc-
cess, therefore, depends on pursuit-one might even suggest maximiza-
tion-of mutual rationality.
Second, if necessary social actions (for example, the production of
survival necessities at a given historical moment) depend on reproducing
a power of inequality, then the resulting distribution of conditions must
maximize the gains of those on the bottom while minimizing the gains
of those at the top, again on the basis of the workability of proceeding
(this is similar to John Rawls' "maximin" principle6 1).
These norms-and the notion of economic success from which
they derive-do not immediately yield a new and unified heterodox
alternative to the methods of neoclassical economists, but they do spot-
light an alternative research focus. They draw attention to the processes
of production and reproduction, not market-based exchange and mass
consumption. And at least some attention to these processes already
exists across heterodox camps, providing an opportunity for develop-
ment of common tools and analyses.68
Focusing economics on production (and reproduction) can also
have important implications for our assessment of the sociological pro-
cess as it relates to the intersection of law and economics.
First, if one is committed to the aim of unalienated experience, then
coordination and development of the division of labor should be a pri-
mary consideration regarding the production process. Whenever worka-
ble, the connection between worker and job would be based on
incentives of cooperation, rather than competition, within each enter-
65. Hyman P. Minsky & Charles J. Whalen, Economic Insecurity and the Institutional
Prerequisites for Successful Capitalism, 19 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 155, 161 (1997).
66. This is consistent with Sen's idea of capability egalitarianism. SEN, supra note 59, at
231-38.
67. JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 152-53 (1971).
68. See, e.g., ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 34, at 127; LAVOIE, supra note 6, at 10; Dugger,
supra note 8, at 47; Power, supra note 64. See generally Steve Pressman, Alternative Views of the
State, in ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF THE STATE 1, 1 (Steven Pressman ed., 2006); James Ronald
Stanfield & Michael C. Carroll, The Social Economics ofNeoliberal Globalization, 38 F. FOR
Soc. ECON. 1 (2009). Indeed, a focus on production would have even interested Adam Smith. See
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., 1904) (1776).
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prise.69 Institutionally, the best current practice would be worker owner-
ship, or at least worker management, of enterprises.70 Ownership and
management of enterprises would additionally be democratic; forms of
worker ownership that remove management from worker control, as is
the case with many employment stock option plans, do not contribute to
production on the basis of mutualism.
Note that worker control does not mean a division of labor unspe-
cialized as to job or aggregated such that all enterprise decisions require
daily debate and vote. Operations can be managed by an employee of
the employees or by interlocking committees chosen by them. Discipline
and productivity assurance can be delegated. There would, however, be
a guiding question: do the arrangements enable workers to feel they are
mutually acting to produce?71
The notion could even be extended. Enterprises could be coordi-
nated by regional works councils, which would represent workers, con-
sumers, and the public-goods sector.72 And if an enterprise fails as
measured by low production or unjustifiable input costs, then the result-
ing dislocated workers-available for production in some other capac-
ity-would be supported by a social wage.7 3 Government would not
guarantee the right to a job, but the right to productive activity (there is
no need to reinscribe the paid/unpaid work distinction).7 1
Second, it follows that deployment of surplus resources would be
democratically accountable. Again this does not mean a national referen-
dum on every resource use. There would, however, be a public decision
on tradeoffs between the provision of public goods, like infrastructure or
mutual consumption in the form of green space, and enterprise develop-
ment and expansion.
69. See Schmid, supra note 23, at 7-9, 20-21; Michael J. Piore, The Social Embeddedness of
Labor Markets and Cognitive Processes, 7 LABOUR 3, 5-6 (1993).
70. Worker management functions as a strategy to improve economic performance, promote
greater worker autonomy, foster workplace democracy, and increase worker dignity. See WILBER
& JAMESON, supra note 56.
71. For a classic study of worker cooperatives, see generally WILLIAM FOOTE WHYTE &
KATHLEEN KING WHYTE, MAKING MONDRAGON: THE GROWTH AND DYNAMICS OF THE WORKER
COOPERATIVE COMPLEX (2d ed. 1991).
72. Id.
73. On the Workers' Unemployment and Social Insurance Bill introduced in Congress in the
1930s, see Kenneth M. Casebeer, Unemployment Insurance: American Social Wage, Labor
Organization and Legal Ideology, 35 B.C. L. REv. 259, 261-63 (1994).
74. Elements of this approach exist in proposals for a basic income guarantee, and the paid
parental leave policies of many advanced economies. See Pavlina R. Tcherneva, Job or Income
Guarantee? (Univ. of Mo.-Kansas City, Working Paper No. 29, 2003); REBECCA RAY ET AL.,
CTR. FOR EcON. & POLICY RESEARCH, PARENTAL LEAVE POLICIES IN 21 COUNTRIES: ASSESSING
GENEROSITY AND GENDER EQUALITY (2009).
75. Nari Rhee & Julie Anna Sadler, Building an Inclusive City: Labor-Community Coalitions
and the Struggle for Urban Power in San Jose, in LABOR IN THE NEW URBAN BATTLEGROUNDS:
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Following Amartya Sen,7 6 this tradeoff would aim at more than
mere survival of all, which would seem to require substantial growth of
"product" (not accumulation-or even maximization-of money or
wealth as currently understood)." Further, overcoming inequality of
conditions would be accomplished through adjusting the provisioning
process to create more product to address human wants, rather than by a
leveling of differences via political redistribution of that which has been
produced." Legally, these pursuits would be underwritten by entitle-
ments to conditions of meaningful choice and mutual interactions, as
opposed to property rights as a bundle of disposal uses that merely set
initial bargaining positions subject to exchange.7 9 The aim is an eco-
nomics of interdependent agency enabling human freedom, not a new
form of subordination.so
Third, this approach to social provisioning would reconnect use
value to production." Rights associated with resource use, supple-
mented by rights that address incompatible uses (in cases of excludabil-
LOCAL SOLIDARITY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 178, 186-88 (Lowell Turner & Daniel B. Cornfield
eds., 2007).
76. SEN, supra note 59.
77. Whatever is produced, call it "product," rather than a "commodity," to distinguish it from
false categories along a continuum from things to goods to services to technologies to knowledge
to abstractions.
78. To be sure, issues of sustainability, resource depletion, and environmental stewardship
must also be considered. See Robert Heilbroner, Economics in the Twenty-First Century, in
POLITICAL ECONOMY FOR TiH 21sT CENTURY, supra note 8, at 265, 273.
79. Karl Klare proposes four commitments for a new political economy: property rights
should foster the widest possible participation in social actions; property rights should inhibit
wealth concentration as much as possible; externalities should be minimized; and the highest
possible social wage and benefits should be created. Karl E. Klare, Legal Theory and Democratic
Reconstruction: Reflections on 1989, 25 U. BRT. COLUMBIA L. REV. 69 (1991).
80. Freedom arises only with human consciousness and is actualized only in human
action. Freedom, therefore, is not something that is absolutely guaranteed-it is not
a natural inalienable right. It is, as John Dewey pointed out, that secure release and
fulfillment of national potentialities "which take place only in rich and manifold
association with others." Freedom today depends on interdependence, a community
of people and nations. If that community is impaired, so is freedom. Freedom is not
the natural presupposition of national and international life; it is the result of that
life.
Shaun Gallagher, Interdependence and Freedom in Hegel's Economics, in HEGEL ON ECONOMICS
AND FREEDOM 159, 181 (William Maker ed., 1987) (citation omitted).
81. See ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 34, at 124. Under judicial interpretation of the National
Labor Relations Act, Klare observes:
[T]he treatment of workers as sellers of labor power and as consumers of
commodities, but not as producers, hindered them from achieving an alternative
perspective in which worker self-activity, the process by which workers produce
value by embodying their labor power in things, services, and relationships, would
be recognized as the basis of all production in, and reproduction of, society.
Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 321 (1978).
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ity or consumption rivalry),8 2 would at least be prior to creation of any
property rights for exchange."
Exchange requires some medium in any economy of growing scope
and complexity.84 Yet while exchanges are necessary for coordination,
product in a sociolegal process focused on production and reproduction
would be initially valued on the basis of worker contribution in order to
avoid reinscribing an inequality of power as mere accumulation. A
level of worker effort or contribution could be agreed upon within the
enterprise and then translated according to product use value." Perhaps
this would involve some kind of product-per-time-and-labor, a produc-
tivity ratio that could be monetized." The new economics would still
treat incentives seriously both for individuals" and organizations."
H1. CONCLUSION
This article has addressed two issues that can help strengthen heter-
odox economics. First, it explained the need to base such an economics
on the reality of human interdependence. Heterodox economics has long
recognized the role of power in economic life, but coupling that recogni-
tion with a greater appreciation of interdependence opens the door to a
better understanding of "what is" as well as to a more constructive dis-
cussion of "what ought to be." Second, it highlighted the utility of focus-
ing that economics upon production, not exchange. These changes
provide the foundation for a new economics of mutual rationality and
thus can contribute to more fruitful examinations of the sociolegal pro-
cess in those areas where law and economics intersect.
This new approach would have far-reaching consequences for eco-
nomic analysis in the fields of law, economics, and beyond. The neo-
classical supply-and-demand framework would not be merely renamed
or reformed. Rather, its static, two-dimensional framework would be
replaced by a dynamic, multidimensional framework involving: product
82. Schmid, supra note 23, at 26 n.25.
83. See generally Schmid, supra note 23.
84. "In capitalism, this regulation is not effected through the direct and conscious control of
society over its labor time . . . but through the movement of commodity prices." Paolucci, supra
note 55, at 180.
85. RANDY ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 34, at 127.
86. Arild Vatn, Institutions and Rationality, in ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES:
EVOLUTION AND IMPACT, supra note 18, at 132.
87. In Ithaca, New York, labor productivity has been monetized into Ithaca HOURS. See,
e.g., Paul Glover, Ithaca HOURS, in INVESTED IN THE COMMON GOOD 155, 155 (Susan Meeker-
Lowry ed., 1995).
88. Even though attributing results to individuals is causally problematic. See Schmid, supra
note 23, at 26 n.20.
89. Rather than profit-seeking, enterprises would be focused toward producing surplus
product.
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efficiency, satisfaction of material needs and wants, meaningful work,
freedom and justice, equality of opportunity and access, social and eco-
nomic stability, technological development, and ecological
sustainability.90
The needed new economics-an economics modeled on interde-
pendent agency, pursued through mutual rationality, and in service of
human flourishing-does not yet seem to exist on other than a counter-
narrative basis.9 ' In fact, there is evidence that a number of producer
movements have recently emerged and that advances in the realm of
practice have outstripped those in economic scholarship.9 2 It is time for
economics to catch up and contribute to fashioning new productive
human behavior.
We need change. We have no alternative. We can do no other. We
cannot go back and redo. We can only move on from here. That is
history.
90. For a recent, but more modest, effort to move in this direction, see JOHN W. BUDD,
EMPLOYMENT WITH A HUMAN FACE: BALANCING EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND VOICE (2004).
91. [T]his process would correspond to a morally oriented process of action in the area
of social labor, which recovers the work content of instrumental acts from the
dominant forms of work. The valid normative claim which thus comes to expression
results from the moral vulnerability which grows not from the suppression of
communicative modes of mutual understanding, but from the expropriation of the
workers' own work activity. The moral knowledge which is constructed on the basis
of such experiences is embodied in acts of work which maintain their autonomy
even in the organizational reality of externally determined work relations.
Axel Honneth, Work and Instrumental Action, NEw GERMAN CRITIQUE, Spring-Summer 1982, at
31, 54.
92. Hoyt Wheeler, Producers of the World Unite! A Return of Reformist Unionism? 29 LAB.
STUD. J. 81, 84-85 (2004).
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